A Three-Stage Quantum Cryptography Protocol by Kak, Subhash
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
05
03
02
7v
2 
 2
 M
ar
 2
00
5
A Three-Stage Quantum Cryptography Protocol
Subhash Kak
Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA 70803, USA
September 13, 2018
Abstract
We present a three-stage quantum cryptographic protocol based on
public key cryptography in which each party uses its own secret key.
Unlike the BB84 protocol, where the qubits are transmitted in only
one direction and classical information exchanged thereafter, the com-
munication in the proposed protocol remains quantum in each stage.
A related system of key distribution is also described.
Introduction
This paper presents a quantum protocol based on public key cryptogrpahy
for secure transmission of data over a public channel. The security of the
protocol derives from the fact that Alice and Bob each use secret keys in
the multiple exchange of the qubit.
Unlike the BB84 protocol [1] and its many variants (e.g. [2]-[4]), where
the qubits are transmitted in only one direction and classical information
exchanged thereafter, the communication in the proposed protocol remains
quantum in each stage. In the BB84 protocol, each transmitted qubit is in
one of four different states; in the proposed protocol, the transmitted qubit
can be in any arbitrary state.
The Protocol
Consider the arrangement of Figure 1 to transfer state X from Alice to
Bob. The state X is one of two orthogonal states, such as 0〉 and |1〉, or
1√
2
(|0〉+|1〉) and 1√
2
(|0〉−|1〉), or α|0〉+β|1〉 and β|0〉−α|1〉. The orthogonal
states of X represent 0 and 1 by prior mutual agreement of the parties, and
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Figure 1: Three-stage protocol for quantum cryptography where UAUB =
UBUA
this is the data or the cryptographic key being transmitted over the public
channel.
Alice and Bob apply secret transformations UA and UB which are com-
mutative, i.e., UAUB = UBUA. An example of this would be UA = R(θ) and
UB = R(φ), each of which is the rotation operator:
R(θ) =
[
cosθ −sinθ
sinθ cosθ
]
The sequence of operations in the protocol is as follows:
1. Alice applies the transformation UA on X and sends the qubit to Bob.
2. Bob applies UB on the received qubit UA(X) and sends it back to
Alice.
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3. Alice applies U †
A
on the received qubit, converting it to UB(X), and
forwards it to Bob.
4. Bob applies U †
B
on the qubit, converting it to X.
At the end of the sequence, the state X, which was chosen by Alice and
transmitted over a public channel, has reached Bob.
Eve, the eavesdropper, cannot obtain any information by intercepting the
transmitted qubits, although she could disrupt the exchange by replacing
the transmitted qubits by her own. This can be detected by
• appending parity bits, and/or
• appending previously chosen bit sequences, which could be the des-
tination and sending addresses or their hashed values, or some other
mutually agreed sequence.
Since the U transformations can be changed as frequently as one pleases,
Eve cannot obtain any statistical clues to their nature by intercepting the
qubits.
Key distribution protocol
A related key distribution protocol is given in Figure 2. Unlike the previous
case, X is a fixed public state (say |0〉 or 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)). The objective is to
generate a key that is a function of the transformations involved, which is
not chosen in advance by either party. The protocol consists of two stages:
1. Alice and Bob use secret transformations, UA and UB , on the known
state X, and exchange these qubits.
2. They again apply the same transformations on the received qubits,
thereby each getting UAUB(X), since UAUB = UBUA. It is assumed
that neither Alice or Bob will measure the received qubits, and will
use them as the input to a quantum register.
In a variant of this scheme, two copies of the unknown state X may be
supplied to Alice and Bob by a key registration authority.
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Figure 2: Key distribution protocol, where UAUB = UBUA.
Conclusion
The three-stage protocol provides perfect security in the exchange of data
over a public channel under the assumptions that a separate classical proto-
col ensures the identity of the two parties, and errors (deliberate or random)
are detected by means of parity check and confirming that a known bit se-
quence that was appended to the bits has arrived correctly.
Since the proposed protocol does not use classical communication, it is
immune to the man-in-the-middle attack on the classical communication
channel which BB84 type quantum cryptography protocols suffers from [5].
On the other hand, implementation of this protocol may be harder because
the qubits get exchanged multiple times.
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